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1. INTRODUCTION
The republican government has fulfilled all but one of its promises to the public.
The one and only promise it has been unable to keep has to do with the opium
problem!1
Emin Sazak, deputy from Eskişehir, made this statement before parliament on 24 June
1938. Such explicit criticism however, was unusual under the authoritarian single-party
regime of the inter-war era. Sazak’s reproach regarding lack of attention to the issue hints
at the contentious nature of the opium problem, and all the dissenting opinions, clash-
ing priorities, conflicts of interest, and divisiveness it created among Turkish ruling elites.
This article examines the changing policies regarding opium in early republican Turkey
by focusing on the conflicting discourses and political agendas of the various actors
involved. 
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1. «Toprak mahsulleri ofisi kanunu layihası ve İktisad, Ziraat, Maliye ve Bütçe encümenleri
mazbataları (1/1038) (Draft bill No. 1/1038 on the Soil Products Office and minutes of the meetings
of the Councils of Economy, Agriculture, Treasury and Budget)», (1938: 312).
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In 1933, Turkey enacted a series of laws that included ratification of international con-
ventions on opium, establishment of the Turkish Narcotic Drugs Monopoly, state con-
trol of narcotic drugs and amendment of the Criminal Code. The new approach redefined
opium-related concepts and the subsequent laws transformed all stages of the opium in-
dustry, from poppy production to the manufacture of derivatives, from export of raw
opium to the import of derivatives. With the enactment of these new laws, the state set
the rules for the opium business, and began to play a central role through the establish-
ment of the Narcotic Drugs Monopoly. The legal changes were driven by international
and domestic tensions and the changing perception of the «opium problem» throughout
the world, but their implementation created new conflicts among Turkish governing elites.
In this context opium became a significant issue in Turkish politics during the 1930s, lead-
ing to the first instances of political conflict over opium in modern Turkish history. 
A second crisis led to the prohibition of opium production in 1971. Political pressure
from the USA motivated the government instituted after the 1971 coup d’état to intro-
duce this prohibition, which was repealed in 1974 by the coalition government that was
formed after the 1973 general elections. Due to its recent and international nature, this
second opium crisis is the subject of a number of studies2 in Turkish historiography. These
studies usually mention the regulations of the 1930s simply to provide a brief historical
outline of the opium issue. The only detailed study of the opium context of the 1930s is
a discussion of the history of drug addiction and organized crime in Turkey, found in
Erdinç (2004)3. Though very informative on international smuggling and the complex
diplomacy of the pre-regulation period, Erdinç’s study lacks a satisfactory, archive-based
analysis of the post-regulation period. A historical discussion of changes in opium poli-
tics in Turkey during the 1930s is sorely lacking in the literature. This article aims to sat-
isfy the need by approaching the issue with regard to both international transformations
and domestic political conflict.
Apart from the studies focusing directly on opium politics, it is also remarkable that
there is virtually no reference to the «opium question» in the economic, political and/or
diplomatic histories of early republican Turkey. The sole reference is found in Goloğlu’s
2. For a description of the events from the perspective of an American Foreign Service officer serv-
ing in Turkey from 1970 to 1974, see SPAIN (1975). For two works in Turkish discussing the crisis as
a form of «American imperialism», see ALTINDAL (1979) and SONGAR (1974). For a discussion of
Turkish-USA relations, comparing the opium crisis of the early 1970s to the 2002-3 Iraq crises, see
ROBINS (2007). Finally, for two recent accounts addressing the «experiences of opium poppy eradi-
cation and re-introduction in the early 1970s» based on oral history interviews of retired poppy farm-
ers, see EVERED (2011a, 2011b).
3. Erdinç’s chapters on opium in the 1930s are primarily based on USA intelligence reports re-
garding narcotics, from the United States Embassy archives in Ankara.
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4. For some examples, see AHMAD (1981), BARLAS (1998), GOLOĞLU (1972), LEWIS (1968), PARLA
(1992) and ZÜRCHER (2003).
5. Historiographic commitment to the views held by state elites, regardless of their actual practical
power, is also fed by the scarcity of primary archival sources. However, in recent years, this scarcity
has been offset by the emergence of new archival sources or the re-evaluation of existing ones. For the
former, see AKÇETIN (2000: 79-102), AKIN (2007: 435-457), METINSOY (2011: 699-719); for the lat-
ter, see BROCKETT (1998: 44-66), ÖZBEK (2003: 219-240).
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book chronicling the significant events of the early Republican Era from the official per-
spective. There is a short chapter entitled «Opium Law» which describes it as the «most
important affair of 1933» (Goloğlu, 1972: 77-78). Although the history of the opium prob-
lem offers a rich vein of information even for conventional Turkish historiography, there
is no reference to the issue. This article suggests that such overall neglect cannot be at-
tributed to the mere lack of primary archival sources from this period. The «absence» of
the issue primarily stems from certain dominant epistemological assumptions in the eco-
nomic and political historiography of the early Republican Era.
The founding and construction of the new republican nation-state occupied the early
Republican Era between 1923 and 1945. The era was characterized by an etatist econ-
omy, a single-party political regime and nationalist ideology. This trio thematically dom-
inates the historiography of early republican Turkey4, in which the study of these three
themes separately has curtailed initiatives that address issues such as the opium problem;
where economy, politics, and ideology intersect. This article attempts to remove histori-
ographical blinders in order to focus on how these three themes intersected and were man-
ifested in a specific issue: the opium problem. 
However, historiographical disregard for intersecting themes does not completely ex-
plain the absence of a convincing discussion of opium policies in the early Republican
Era. This disregard has been reinforced by the epistemological premise about histori-
cal agency that upheld the Kemalist state elites, successors of a strong state tradition
with specific bureaucratic and military characteristics, acting as the sole, dominant, and
homogenous agents of economic, political, and ideological life. This article challenges
the prevailing premises of early republican historiography regarding both the absolute
dominance and the homogeneity of the ruling elites. The first premise is mainly the re-
sult of an overemphasis on the intentions and discourses of state elites. When official
declarations are taken at face value, the focus is generally on how the Kemalist elites
managed to produce policies, rather than how they were executed, or even whether they
could be implemented5. This article gives attention to the difference between the de-
clared and realized aims, by examining: 1) the historical development and legislation
resulting from the opium problem, 2) the execution of these measures, 3) what Turk-
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ish ruling elites intended to do about the opium problem, and 4) how solutions were
put into practice. 
Moreover, this article highlights the heterogeneity, rather than homogeneity of the rul-
ing elites, to challenge the second premise regarding historical agency. The divisions among
Kemalist elites are generally discussed either as mainly personal conflicts among promi-
nent figures of the Republican People’s Party or as differences of opinion regarding the
content and extent of the revolutions after the foundation of the Republic6. However, seg-
ments of ruling elites could and actually did clash over differences in their institutional pri-
orities; which were exemplified in the management of opium policies. For example, the
Ministry of Economy pursued policies to maintain the wealth generated by the country’s
vital export crop, in order to meet the urgent economic needs of the new Republic. The
Ministry of Health, however, sought policies on this «poison» that were more restrictive
and compatible with the accepted international conventions. Colliding expectations, vi-
sions, and strategies regarding how to address the opium problem during the 1930s led
to division and conflict among the state elites. 
2. CHANGES IN OPIUM POLICIES AND POLITICS IN THE EARLY
TWENTIETH CENTURY
Opium is one of the oldest and most widespread agricultural products in the world. Its
cultivation dates from 3500 BC and was extensive throughout the civilisations of
Mesopotamia, Ancient Greece and Egypt. Its popularity derives from widespread use of
the poppy flower for food and anaesthesia, and from the various ritualistic and cultural
meanings that have become attached to opium. During its long history, knowledge, per-
ceptions and feelings about opium have varied from one age, place or community to an-
other. Brook and Wakabayashi (2000: 25) highlight that opium has a «polymorphous char-
acter», which lends to it many and changeable meanings in different social, political and
economic contexts. However, by the twentieth century, its multifaceted nature had trig-
gered worldwide controversy regarding how to define, police, and regulate opium.
Courtwright (2002: 167) observes that the «collective shift in priorities» on the opium
question did not reach domestic and international politics until the early 1900s, not
before.
6. Regarding the well-known Inönü –Bayar and Inönü– Peker political rivalry, see KARPAT (1991).
On the differences of opinions on certain principles of the new regime, see HALE (1980) and UYAR
(1997).
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During the nineteenth century, opium became one of the most important commodi-
ties for the European empires, and its trade was crucial in the colonisation of the Far East.
As a commodity, it provided huge profits that led to a transfer of wealth and power to West-
ern imperial regimes (Brook and Wakabayashi, 2000: 25). Opium was widely used as a
medical palliative and for recreational purposes in the Far East. The Western colonial pow-
ers made no attempt to change or suppress the recreational use of opium due to an un-
willingness to lose profits, an interest in benefitting from its medicinal use, and a desire
to avoid potential upheavals in the colonies if its use were to be curbed. They also believed
that opium use was inherent to the Oriental people (Gavit, 1925: 55-58). Whatever the
reasons, and regardless of its medical, moral, and cultural connotations, Western traders
viewed opium as a very profitable commodity.
By the turn of the twentieth century, the situation began to change as the cumulative
result of many different but interconnected factors. New technologies -most significantly
the development of hypodermic syringes- and the rapidly developing chemical industry
made access to opium and its derivatives easier, cheaper, and faster for the masses in West-
ern countries (Courtwright, 2002: 173-179; McAllister, 2000: 14-15). As the «democra-
tisation» of opium spread the usage of this drug beyond the borders of China, public opin-
ion began to sway under the increasing influence of medical professionals campaigning
against the non-medical use of opium7. The USA led this campaign motivated both by
competition with Great Britain’s interests in the Asian opium traffic and the restriction-
oriented policy demands of domestic reform groups (McAllister, 2000: 27-28; Walker,
1991). Additionally, the «internationalist» mind-set in diplomatic circles since the mid-
1800s directly influenced the call for intercontinental cooperation and negotiation re-
garding the drug issue; which materialised in the first quarter of the twentieth century
(McAllister, 2000: 20). The power relations affecting the future of opium policies were
profoundly transformed by complex and multi-layered dynamics that included: new tech-
nologies, spreading opium usage, changes in public opinion, the medicalisation of opium
and the increasing power of medical professionals, competing imperial interests, and the
leading international role of the USA in the anti-opium campaign.
In this changing context, opium came to be seen as a «poison» that was dangerous to
society as a whole and should only be used for scientific or medical purposes (Gavit, 1925:
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7. On the «democratisation» of opium use in the Western world, see COURTWRIGHT (1982). For the
prominent figures of the anti-opium group and their efforts to change public opinion in China and
Britain, see SZE (1926) and WILLOUGHBY (1925). For other social reform groups demanding regu-
lation for various reasons, see BROWN (1973: 97-111), CHAMBERLAIN (1937: 285-286) and
COURTWRIGHT (2002: 169-173). For a good example of the medicalisation of opium, see the 1,000-
page report written by a group of American physicians covering all aspects of the opium problem, from
the medical perspective (TERRY and PELLENS, 1928). 
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169-170; McAllister, 2000: 46-50). In the medicalisation discourse, opium users were no
longer seen as inferior races or criminals, but addicts in need of treatment. Moreover, the
opium problem was no longer limited to the Far East, but became an issue that should
be governed by an international body, such as the League of Nations, «for the sake of the
general progress and peace» (Crowdy, 1928: 350). As a result, the governing economic
principle of the opium industry also shifted from a laissez-faire mentality toward restric-
tion and selective prohibition. New policies were formulated that established special gov-
ernmental bodies regulating the opium problem. To enhance state control, measures were
introduced that limited opium production to the level needed for medical and scientific
aims, along with an import-export certification system including double-verification by
the two trading states, prohibition of unauthorised individuals or institutions from par-
ticipating in domestic and international trade of raw or manufactured opium products,
and a world-wide, transparent and demonstrable information sharing system for all
available and estimated economic indicators for opium in each country (Gavit, 1925: 169-
219; Inglis, 1975: 154-177; McAllister, 2000: 43-102; Willoughby, 1925; Wright, 1925:
559-568). All of these measures were discussed in the international conferences on
opium, though consensus was difficult to achieve due to the conflicting interests of dif-
ferent states. As a result, two international conventions were developed at Geneva, one
in 1925 and the other in 19318.
The general impact of the changing international atmosphere towards opium pro-
ducing countries was either restriction and control or total prohibition of opium pro-
duction in the first half of the twentieth century. Producer countries began to report their
figures for area, production, and quantity of exports to the corresponding supervisory in-
ternational organisation -first the League of Nations and then the United Nations- while
maintaining collaborative political relations with the supervisory body. According to the
1949 United Nations Bulletin on Narcotics, opium cultivation was prohibited in Egypt,
Afghanistan, Japan, and China, and restricted to certain regions or provinces in Yugoslavia,
Turkey, Pakistan, India, and the USSR. Iran had decreed prohibition of opium produc-
tion in 1946, but this decree was not enacted into law by the Iranian parliament9. The over-
all trend toward restriction and/or prohibition of cultivation had significant political, so-
cial and economic consequences for the producing countries. 
8. Prior to the 1931 Geneva Conference, the 1909 Shanghai Opium Commission, the 1911 Hague
Opium Conference, and the 1924–1925 Geneva Conferences on opium were all concerned with the
development of regulation efforts. 
9. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (25 May 2012: 6-38). http://www.unodc.org/unodc/
en/data-and-analysis/bulletin/bulletin_1949-01-01_1_page005.html. 
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3. TURKEY AS AN OPIUM-PRODUCING COUNTRY: AN OVERVIEW
Turkey has always been one of the largest opium producing and exporting countries in
the world. Since the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the United Nations,
which is the authorised body for international drug control, has considered Turkey,
along with India, as «traditional legal opium producers» because both countries have his-
torically had the biggest share of legal production areas. Between 2005 and 2010, for in-
stance, Turkey was responsible for 48 per cent of total legal opium production, while In-
dia produced 14 per cent of the total (Haşhaş Raporu, 2010: 5-6). The degree of
historical presence of opium in the Turkish economy and culture is even reflected in the
name of the city in the heart of the production area: Afyon, which means «opium» in Turk-
ish. Map 1 illustrates the geographical distribution of cultivation, showing the districts in
Turkey where opium cultivation was permitted or prohibited by 1933/34. 
MAP 1
Districts in Turkey where opium cultivation was permitted or prohibited by 1933/34 
Source: Narcotic Drugs Monopoly (s.a.).
The map shows how cultivation was concentrated mainly in two geographical areas, which
produced two different kinds of opium. The «drogist» (druggist) opium was cultivated
mainly around Afyon in the west, while «soft opium» was produced in the districts
around Amasya and Tokat in the north. According to a 1950 article in the Bulletin on Nar-
cotics on Turkish cultivation, druggist opium was used exclusively for medical purposes.
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Soft opium, with its higher morphine content, was mainly preferred by addicts for smok-
ing purposes10. Map 1 also shows the districts where opium cultivation was prohibited
by 1933. Out of fifty-six provinces, fourteen were allowed to cultivate the opium poppy
and incise the capsules. Production in other provinces was prohibited by successive leg-
islation in 193311. The impact of prohibition can also be seen in the production area data.
Figure 1 shows the area of opium cultivation in hectares from 1925 to 1946. 
FIGURE 1
Opium cultivation area in Turkey, 1925 – 1946
Source: Doğukan (1949: 49)12.
The area used for opium cultivation was highly volatile, especially in the 1920s. It de-
creased sharply from over 50,000 hectares in 1926 to around 17,000 hectares in 1927,




































10. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (15 July 2013: 13-25). http://www.unodc.org/unodc/
en/data-and-analysis/bulletin/bulletin_1950-01-01_1_page004.html
11. The fourteen provinces allowed producing opium were Afyonkarahisar, Burdur, Bilecik, Denizli,
Eskişehir, Isparta, Konya, Kütahya, Amasya, Çorum, Tokat and Malatya, two districts of Ankara and
three districts of Bursa. 
12. The data are taken from an article by Doğukan, who worked as an agricultural engineer at the
Soil Products Office in the 1940s. Doğukan states that he personally gathered the data for the years
1925, 1926 and 1927, and gathered data for the remaining years from the records of the Public Di-
rectorate of Statistics. However, he does not cite any specific references. I have used Doğukan’s data
because it is the only source offering serial data of opium cultivation in the area for the period before
1950. 
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volatility, such as price instability, climatic factors, and changing international market con-
ditions during the 1920s. Fluctuations in total cultivated area continued from 1928 to
1933, though less violently than in the preceding three years. Two additional factors that
very likely contributed to the rapid shifts between 1928 and 1933 were the emergence of
a buyer cartel established by European opium manufacturers in 1928, and the worldwide
effects of the Great Depression. Another sharp decrease occurred from 1933 to 1934,
when total cultivated area dropped from 45,082 hectares to 20,168 hectares (see dotted
line on Figure 1). This drop was mainly due to newly adopted opium restriction meas-
ures imposed by the Turkish government. After the 1933 prohibition, the cultivated area
never exceeded the pre-legislation level of 45,082 hectares.
Here it should be noted that in early republican Turkey poppy cultivation was over-
whelmingly the domain of small family farmers; this is primarily because opium is one
of the most labour intensive crops, with special harvesting requirements. The 1950 Bul-
letin article on Turkish opium cultivation described its importance for the subsistence of
small farmers and the difficulties involved in replacing opium with other cash crops due
to climatic and soil conditions13. There is no satisfactory statistical data to provide more
detailed information on opium producers in early republican Turkey, but the available data
estimates that 80,000 to 100,000 peasant households were involved in cultivating opium
in the 1930s14. That translates into approximately 1.3 per cent of total agricultural em-
ployment, and 1.1 per cent of total employment15. A 1933 estimate by the Istanbul Cham-
ber of Commerce and Industry indicates that approximately 600,000 people, or four per
cent of the total population, were involved in the opium sector, including producers, mer-
chants, and their families (Bahtiyar, 1933: 6).
Turkey did not produce opium gum for domestic consumption; it was an export-ori-
ented commodity and had no relevance nationally. The only domestic use of the opium
poppy involved seed harvesting for oil extraction, not for gum16. The main purchasers of
13. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (15 July 2013: 13-25). http://www.unodc.org/unodc/
en/data-and-analysis/bulletin/bulletin_1950-01-01_1_page004.html
14. Bahtiyar states that there were 100,000 peasant families cultivating opium in the 1930s (Bahti-
yar, 1933: 6). However, the article published in the 1950 Bulletin of the United Nations says that the
poppy-plant is grown in Turkey by about 80,000 peasants inhabiting the (permitted) districts. United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (15 July 2013: 13-25). http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-
and-analysis/bulletin/bulletin_1950-01-01_1_page004.html.
15. Between 1930 and 1945, there were approximately 6 million persons employed in agriculture,
with total employment of almost 7 million active persons in Turkey. For employment data, see İSTA-
TISTIK GÖSTERGELER, 1923-2008 (2009: 164-165). 
16. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (15 July 2013: 13-25). http://www.unodc.org/unodc/
en/data-and-analysis/bulletin/bulletin_1950-01-01_1_page004.html.
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Turkish opium in the early Republican Era were the USA and European countries, es-
pecially Germany, France, England and the Netherlands (Narcotic Drugs Monopoly, s.a.:
100). It will be important to keep this sense of Turkey as an opium producing country in
mind as we begin a more focused discussion of the opium problem for Turkish govern-
ing elites during the early Republican Era. 
4. THE NEW TURKISH REPUBLIC IN THE CROSSFIRE OF THE OPIUM
QUESTION
The new Turkish Republic signed the Lausanne Treaty in 1923 after World War I. Like
all other peace treaties signed after World War I, the Lausanne Treaty included an article
recognising the 1912 Hague Convention on opium (Bahtiyar, 1933: 22). However, the
advisory character of the Convention did not lead to any serious changes. When Süreyya
Bey, the Undersecretary of Agriculture, represented Turkey at the 1925 Geneva Confer-
ence, he abstained from voting for the American proposal to control the production and
distribution of raw opium and coca-leaves. He also withheld from signing the final dec-
laration, most likely due to sovereignty concerns (Gavit, 1925: 197, 200). 
Before the 1930s, there were no legal restrictions on opium production or trade in
Turkey. Like any other crop, opium was produced by peasants and sold to commission
merchants or big opium trade companies. After 1926, opium was sold on the exchange
markets of Istanbul and Izmir. The laboratories of these exchange markets determined
the morphine levels of the product, which was an important parameter for price setting.
Before this date, testing was only done on demand from European buyers (Erdemir, 1996:
28). A comprehensive study conducted in 1933 on behalf of the Istanbul Chamber of
Commerce and Industry notes that exchange market laboratory accreditation of morphine
levels was considered advantageous for Turkish opium merchants in the export markets
(Bahtiyar, 1933: 14). 
As with the production and domestic trade of opium, the manufacture of alkaloids had
been unrestricted before the 1930s17. There were three alkaloid factories in Istanbul. The
17. Alkaloid is isolated from the milky exudates of the unripe seed pods of the opium poppy. The six
opium alkaloids that occur naturally in the largest amounts are morphine, narcotine, codeine, the-
baine, papaverine and narceine. Three of these, morphine, codeine and thebaine, are used in the drug
industry and are now under international control. Apart from these, about twenty other alkaloids
exist in opium but are medically and economically insignificant. See United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime (30 March 2012). http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/bulletin/bul-
letin_1953-01-01_3_page005.html. 
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first was the Oriental Products Company, established in 1926 with Japanese capital, and
located in Taksim, on the north shore of the Golden Horn. The second was the Medical
and Chemical Pharmacy (Eczayı Tıbbiye ve Kimyeviye - ETKIM), founded in May 1929
by Nissim Taranto, a well-known Turkish-Jewish opium merchant, and located in Eyüp.
The Taranto family had been involved in the opium trade since the 1860s and ETKIM
had numerous international contacts for exporting manufactured opium derivatives.
The third and largest factory was the Turkish Medical and Chemical Pharmacy Company
(Türk Ecza-yı Tıbbiye ve Kimyeviye Şirketi - TETKAŞ), which was founded in Decem-
ber 1929 with French capital, and located on the Bosphorus in Kuzguncuk, a neighbor-
hood of Istanbul. Its executive board included men such as Hasan Bey (Saka), a leading
Turkish politician, and Adrien Billiotti, a French lawyer and partner in sixteen other com-
panies in Turkey (Erdinç, 2004: 54-69)18.
The alkaloid-manufacturing factories in Istanbul felt the brunt of the international
pressure on Turkey in the early 1930s. As a participant of the 1931 Geneva Conference,
the second largest international gathering on opium, Turkey was forced to shut these fac-
tories down due to the illicit trafficking originating from them. Additionally, the Confer-
ence raised the necessity to decrease Turkey’s opium production in order to comply with
the limits set for «medical and scientific purposes» (McAllister, 2000: 95). After the Con-
ference, US diplomats, representatives of the League of Nations, and Russell Pasha19 ex-
erted even greater pressure, accusing Turkey of smuggling and of not «understanding the
humanitarian aspects of the struggle against narcotic drugs»20. Turkey worked to refute
the allegations of smuggling by auditing the factories and introducing a compulsory im-
18. Erdinç states that these factories were linked to international mafia organisations and domesti-
cally backed by some of the Turkish political elites, known as the Aferistler (speculators; from the
French term «affairiste»). The group met at Is Bank, a private bank founded by Mustafa Kemal
Atatürk in 1924 and governed by Celal Bayar from its foundation. 
19. Sir Thomas Wentworth Russell, known throughout the world as Russell Pasha, was an Egyptian
civil servant, and the Head of the Central Narcotics Intelligence Bureau, which the Egyptian Gov-
ernment set up in 1929. The Bulletin of Narcotics, published in 1954, described him as a legendary
figure based on his outstanding reports to the Advisory Committee (of the League of Nations), which
still constitute a very important source of information on illicit traffic and illicit traffickers. United Na-
tions Office on Drugs and Crime (20 June 2012). http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analy-
sis/bulletin/bulletin_1954-01-01_3_page008.html. 
20. Given mounting international pressure, two moments profoundly impacted Turkish policy: first,
the articles of Russell Pasha published in the Egyptian press and his report on illegal narcotics traf-
ficking presented to the Opium Commission of League of Nations in 1931; and second, the visit of
Mr. Extrant, the Director of the Welfare Affairs and Opium Branch of League of Nations, to Turkey
in the spring of 1932. For the first two, see Prime Ministry State Archive Office of Republican Archive
(PMRA) Catalogue of the General Directorate of Transactions, 030.10/180.243.8. and PMRA Cat-
alogue of the General Directorate of Transactions, 030.10/180.243.17. For the second, see PMRA
Catalogue of the General Directorate of Transactions, 030.10/178.230.5.
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port certification system in February 193121. That month, the factories were closed down
temporarily22.
Along with international pressure on Turkey, the domestic economic conditions relating
to the opium market were far from satisfactory. The sharp decline in prices as a result of
the Great Depression impacted the agricultural sector by the early 1930s. In 1932,
opium prices reached their lowest level in fifteen years (Bahtiyar, 1933: 14; Ziya, 1932:
18). Moreover, European opium manufacturing firms established a cartel in 1928, the
Convention Internationale des Opiaces, which decreased prices in favour of the buyers
(Babaoğlu, 1997: 105; Narcotic Drugs Monopoly, s.a.: 97-98)23. Turkey responded to de-
teriorating market conditions by establishing two new institutions in 1932: the Joint Cen-
tral Office of Turkey and Yugoslavia for Opium Sale (Türkiye-Yugoslavya Müşterek
Afyon Satışı Merkez Bürosu) and the Sales Union of Turkish Opium Producers (Türkiye
Afyon Yetiştiriciler Satış Birliği)24. While the first body struggled to survive in the following
years, following its own charter as a «front involving the best-quality opium producers
against the monopoly buyers»25, the second institution was soon replaced by the Narcotic
Drugs Monopoly (Uyuşturucu Maddeler İnhisarı). 
In 1931-2, the Turkish government implemented partial policies that fell far short of
addressing opium-related problems. In early 1933, it made a radical decision to ratify the
current international conventions on opium. On 25 December 1932, the state-run Ana-
tolian Agency described the government’s narcotics programme as «Turkey’s Christmas
gift to the world»26. The programme, which had seven articles, was formulated with
Mustafa Kemal’s personal attention following meetings with some «grand persons», ac-
21. PMRA Catalogues of Council of Ministers’ Decrees (1928 and afterwards), 30..18.1.2/20.32..7.
22. While the Oriental Products Company was shut down in February 1931, ETKIM continued to
manufacture codeine. ETKIM was shut down in May of the same year and then re-opened in July.
TETKAŞ continued production secretly. For more on the ambivalent policies regarding these facto-
ries in 1931 and 1932, see ERDINÇ (2004: 87-114).
23. The founding firms were E. Merck, Hoffman-La Roche et. Co., Knoll A. G., C. H. Böhringer
Söhne, Thomae, Sandoz, J. F. Macfarlan and Co., T. and H. Smith Ltd., Laboratoire Clin. Comar et
Cie, Comptoir Central des Alcoloides, Société de Recherches Chimiques et d’Applications Indus-
trielles, and Nederlandsche Cocainfabrik.
24. For the Sale Office, see PMRA Catalogues of the Council of Ministers’ Decrees (1928 and af-
terwards), 30..18.1.2/26.16..9. For the Sale Union, see «Türkiye afyon yetiştiriciler satış birliği
hakkında kanun layihası (Draft bill on the Sales Union of Turkish opium producers)», (1932: 478-
480). In assembly discussions of the bill on the sales union, Mustafa Şeref Bey, the Minister of Econ-
omy, insisted that the government not aim to establish a monopoly on opium. Curiously, the official
position on the negation of the opium monopoly changed a few months later. 
25. PMRA Catalogues of Council of Ministers’ Decrees (1928 and afterwards), 30..18.1.2/26.16..9.
26. For the programme, see PMRA Catalogues of Council of Ministers’ Decrees (1928 and after-
wards), 30..18.1.2/32.80..7.
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cording to the US ambassador at that time, Charles Sherrill (1934: 91)27. On 14 Janu-
ary 1933, the Parliament enacted Law No. 2108, adopting all international conventions
on opium28. In the League of Nations, Turkey’s change of official position and favourable
vote decided the fate of the ballot on the conventions, which went into effect on 13 April
1933, with 28 votes in favour and 27 against. Finally, domestic law came into compliance
with international conventions due to the enactment on 31 May 1933 of Law No. 2253
on the Narcotics Drugs Monopoly. 
Law No. 2253 changed Turkish opium politics, putting the newly-established Mo-
nopoly at the core of the whole opium business. By defining prepared opium and its in-
gredients, the law authorised the Narcotic Drugs Monopoly to produce, export and im-
port those ingredients under the Ministry of Economy. The Monopoly was to declare the
price of raw opium, buy raw opium from producers and/or traders, analyse purchased
opium to measure morphine content, and standardise it before being exported. The Board
of Directors of the Narcotic Drugs Monopoly was to consist of five members: one director
and two members appointed by the Ministry of Economy, one by the Ministry of Agri-
culture, and one by the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare. The Monopoly was assigned
a central office in Istanbul, and a branch in Izmir29.
The establishment of the Narcotic Drugs Monopoly was a mechanism by which the
government intervened in the agricultural sector in a way that was compatible with the
nature of that decade, known as the etatist era (Boratav, 1998: 45-62; Owen and Pamuk,
1998: 10-29)30. However, the monopolistic regulation of opium was not caused solely by
27. Charles Sherrill was appointed US ambassador to Ankara in May 1932. Both Sherrill and
Mustafa Kemal were former soldiers, and became close friends, to the extent that Mustafa Kemal
wanted Sherrill to write his biography. In their meetings for the biography, Sherrill lobbied for progress
on the narcotics issue, intimating that the illegal opium trade was backed by some Turkish politicians
and bureaucrats. Disturbed by those intimations, Mustafa Kemal personally convened the Cabinet,
and after this extra-ordinary meeting, which lasted two days, launched the programme. For Sherrill’s
impact on the programme, see ERDINÇ (2004: 121-126).
28. Erdinç writes that attempts were made to postpone the legislation of the programme and official
notification, both of which were emasculated by what he called the Turkish «opium smuggling lobby».
These acts were further disabled by Sherrill’s diplomatic warnings and Mustafa Kemal’s own author-
ity exerted through the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tevfik Rüştü Aras. See ERDINÇ (2004: 126-132).
29. «Uyuşturucu maddeler inhisarı hakkında 1/699 numaralı kanun layihası ve Sıhhat ve İçtimai
muavenet, İktisat ve Adliye encümenleri mazbataları (Draft bill No 1/699 on the narcotic drugs mo-
nopoly and the minutes of the Councils of Health and Welfare, Economy and Justice)», (1933: 470).
30. Examples of the Turkish government’s interventionist policies on agriculture during the etatist era
include: tobacco which was taken over by the Monopoly permanently in 1930; the state-led Agricul-
tural Bank began to purchase wheat directly from producers in 1932; and state-controlled agricultural
sale cooperatives had a decisive impact on the prices of some export-oriented crops such as grapes
and figs.
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etatist priorities. The opium market today is still under total state control, unlike other agri-
cultural sectors where the interventionist policies of the state were dismissed in time.
Hence, the monopolisation of opium has less to do with economic trends than with the
crop itself and how it is perceived. 
In addition to the establishment of the Narcotic Drugs Monopoly, Law No. 2253 re-
stricted opium cultivation. Informed by evaluations from the Ministry of Economy, it fell
to the Ministry of Agriculture to determine the districts that would be allowed to culti-
vate opium. These districts were to be announced in the newspapers, and people would
be informed by the local governing body, the council of elders in each district, especially
in the prohibited regions. Since the prohibition was to be enforced by «all local governors»,
the law did not specify an executive body. Producers had to fill out a declaration form in-
cluding the amount of opium per dönüm (about a quarter of an acre) and the location of
their fields. After passing through the local governmental bodies, the declaration forms
were centralized at the Monopoly offices31.
Regarding alkaloid-manufacturing, the law upheld the earlier 1931 and 1932 decrees
and permanently shut down the three factories in Istanbul. A single factory under Mo-
nopoly control was to be established in Ankara to process prepared opium, but was never
actually set up during that era. 
Raw and prepared opium was to be exported and imported only through the Istanbul
and Izmir customs. By an additional law enacted on 12 June 1933, traders were required
to obtain permission certificates from the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare in or-
der to export and import prepared opium32. In addition, opium could only be sold by
pharmaceutical firms and pharmacists who owned drugstores. After shipment, the cer-
tificates had to be reported to the relevant authority of the importing country, which
meant that the opium trade would involve double-entry book-keeping, at least in prin-
ciple. Lastly, the penal law was changed on 8 June 193333 to make smuggling or illicit
31. «Uyuşturucu maddeler inhisarı hakkında 1/699 numaralı kanun layihası ve Sıhhat ve İçtimai
muavenet, İktisat ve Adliye encümenleri mazbataları (Draft bill No 1/699 on the narcotic drugs mo-
nopoly and the minutes of the Councils of Health and Welfare, Economy and Justice)», (1933: 468-
471).
32. «Uyuşturucu maddelerin murakabesi hakkında 1/741 numaralı kanun layihası ve Sıhhat ve İç-
timai muavenet, İktisat ve Adliye encümenleri mazbataları (Draft bill No 1/741 on narcotic drugs
control and the minutes of the Councils of Health and Welfare, Economy and Justice)», (1933: 215-
218).
33. «Uyuşturucu maddelerin murakabesi hakkında 1/741 numaralı kanun layihası ve Sıhhat ve İçti-
mai muavenet, İktisat ve Adliye encümenleri mazbataları (Draft bill No 1/741 on narcotic drugs con-
trol and the minutes of the Councils of Health and Welfare, Economy and Justice)», (1933: 84).
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selling, buying or use of opium punishable with fines and imprisonment. The penalties
would be heavier if the accused was a doctor, pharmacist, dentist or midwife. The law
defined the individual user as a «patient» under treatment for at least six months in a
hospital. 
The new laws regulating all stages of the opium business were put into effect imme-
diately. While this was welcomed by international actors such as Russell Pasha and rep-
resentatives of the USA, it disheartened domestic opium merchants and producers. In
the atmosphere of uncertainty that existed in 1933, complaints arose from different
groups. Here, it is important to note that the bureaucrats appointed to the newly es-
tablished monopoly sought to manage the transition process by compromising with the
various actors involved, rather than forcing changes on them. A joint commission of the
Ministries of Economy and Agriculture prepared a list of the cities allowed to produce
opium, and announced it on 10 August 193334. The list was amended twice by the end
of the year due to the reactions of the opium producers and the chambers of commerce35.
Moreover, in a meeting with representatives of merchants from Istanbul and Izmir, the
Monopoly offered to guarantee purchase; it would be conditional, requiring the waiver
of their rights to export opium for the first year. The offer was proposed to «protect the
merchants’ interests»36, and the monopoly promised that it would give them a better
price, allowing sales without competition and a search for new markets. The newspaper
Milliyet stated that the merchants accepted this attractive commercial offer purely «on
grounds of conscience»37.
Although this conciliatory attitude towards the different actors defused the tension
slightly in 1933, the opium problem worsened in the second half of the 1930s. The com-
plexity surpassed the predictions of the Kemalist elites, who had primarily sought to dis-
prove smuggling allegations by thoroughly regulating the opium market as proof of the
new regime’s strength. As legislation came into effect, Turkish elites entered a deadlock
of economic and social necessities on the one hand, and conventional obligations on the
other. The clash of these two priorities caused division among the Kemalist elites regarding
how to govern the opium sector. 
Losing wealth or restricting the poison? Changing opium policies in early republican Turkey, 1923-1945
Historia Agraria, 61 ■ Diciembre 2013 ■ pp. 115-143 129
34. PMRA Catalogues of Council of Ministers’ Decrees (1928 and afterwards), 30..18.1.2/38.58..8. 
35. Balıkesir and Manisa were added to the allowed-cities list in November and Aydın in December,
1933. With these additions, seventeen cities were allowed to produce opium. See Narcotic Drugs Mo-
nopoly (s.a.: 71).
36. «Afyon tacirleri davet edilecek», 17 November 1933, Milliyet.
37. «Afyon tacirleri toplandı», 3 December 1933, Milliyet.
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5. THE «TIRESOME, HEAVY ATMOSPHERE»38: A NEW PHASE FOR THE
OPIUM SECTOR
As discussed above, the Narcotic Drugs Monopoly was founded immediately after the en-
actment of the Opium Law, and began operating with newly appointed officials in mid-
June, 1933. However, problems in implementing the law worsened the economic condi-
tions in the opium market. One of these problems was the Monopoly’s lack of funding.
Although the government had proposed 1.5 million liras for the Monopoly, this amount
could not be raised. The Monopoly had to borrow three times that amount from banks
between 1933 and 1935 just to raise the initial capital. On the 1935 balance sheet, the
Monopoly’s management cited the shortage of funds as a main impediment to carrying
out its duties. They worked to increase operating income in order to prevent further bor-
rowing39.
Improving operating income and the quality of the core business proved to be a dif-
ficult endeavour. The Monopoly purchased raw opium from producers, standardised it
according to morphine content, packaged it in wooden crates labelled with an official
«Turkish Republic Narcotic Drugs Monopoly» sticker, and exported the product. How-
ever, it faced serious marketing difficulties in the first two years of operation, mainly due
to on-going commercial disputes with the European opium manufacturing cartel. In the
audit report of 1933 balance sheet of the Monopoly, the Monopoly managers accused the
cartel of blocking negotiations and implementing a boycott policy. They argued that the
cartel’s real agenda was to weaken the Monopoly’s structure within the country40. Car-
tel and Monopoly ceased negotiations in 1934 due to commercial conflicts.
Some deputies in the parliament joined the Monopoly administration in voicing their
displeasure with the European buyers. In the parliamentary meeting for the renewal of
the opium agreement signed by Turkey and Yugoslavia in 1935, Berç Türker, a deputy from
Afyonkarahisar, accused the cartel of paralysing Turkey’s opium commerce. He declared
that while the cartel thwarted Turkey, using a discourse of «serving humanity», its mem-
bers were lining their own pockets41. This view was supported by Emin Sazak, the
38. This expression is from Berç Türker’s parliamentary speech on 14 October 1935. See, «Afy-
onKarahisar saylavı Berç Türkerin afyon satışı hakkındaki şifahi sualine İktisad vekili Celal Bayarın
cevabı» (1935: 74).
39. PMRA Catalogues of Council of Ministers’ Decrees (1928 and afterwards), 30..18.1.2/
73.22..7.p. 3.
40. PMRA Catalogues of Council of Ministers’ Decrees (1928 and afterwards), 30..18.1.2/
56.53..11., p. 2. 
41. «Türkiye Cümhuriyet ile Yugoslavya Hükümeti arasında aktedilen afyon İtilafnamesinin tasdikı
hakkında 1/591 numaralı kanun layihası ve Hariciye ve İktisad encümenleri mazbataları (Draft bill No
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deputy from Eskişehir, and Rasih Kaplan, deputy of Antalya42. The criticisms were
replied by Celal Bayar, the Minister of Economy and the government representative at
that meeting. Bayar did not make satisfactory explanations to defend the government pol-
icy, but rather dismissed the criticism as outside the scope of the meeting43. Despite do-
mestic reactions against the cartel, Turkish economic officials made efforts to improve the
Monopoly’s relations with the cartel, so as to avoid losing its biggest buyer44. Efforts to
improve exports did not begin to bear fruit until 1936. Figure 2 illustrates the evolution
of Turkish opium exports in those years, and shows the sharp decrease between 1933 and
1935.
Faced with financial difficulties and the inability to export to its biggest buyer, the Mo-
nopoly began searching for new markets. However, this was impeded by international con-
vention restrictions, which the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare strongly supported.
The Ministry of Economy’s attempt to sell opium to Manchuria in 1934 provides an ex-
ample of this conflict of interests45. The 1931 Geneva Convention prohibited the export
of opium to China. Manchuria, which was de facto separated from China, wanted to im-
port opium for a factory it had established. The European powers found this unaccept-
able, and sought to remove this factory from market competition, according to a Turk-
ish Ministry of Economy report from 193546. The Ministry of Economy declared that
Turkey should oppose this ruling and export opium to Manchuria. The Ministry of Health
and Social Welfare, however, argued for compliance with international conventions
against selling excess stocks of opium and finding new markets. Manchuria requested
1,000 crates of opium in 1934 and 600 crates in 1935, but Turkey turned down the re-
quest. Manchuria instead purchased opium from Iran, which had no interest in complying
with international conventions. The Manchuria case shows the power of the Ministry of
1/591 on the approval of the opium agreement signed between the Turkish Republic and Yugoslavia
and the minutes of the Councils of Foreign Affairs and Economy)», (1935: 137-138).
42. «Türkiye Cümhuriyet ile Yugoslavya Hükümeti arasında aktedilen afyon İtilafnamesinin tasdikı
hakkında 1/591 numaralı kanun layihası ve Hariciye ve İktisaden cümenleri mazbataları (Draft bill No
1/591 on the approval of the opium agreement signed between the Turkish Republic and Yugoslavia
and the minutes of the Councils of Foreign Affairs and Economy)», (1935:138-139). 
43. «Türkiye Cümhuriyet ile Yugoslavya Hükümeti arasında aktedilen afyon İtilafnamesinin tasdikı
hakkında 1/591 numaralı kanun layihası ve Hariciye ve İktisad encümenleri mazbataları (Draft bill No
1/591 on the approval of the opium agreement signed between the Turkish Republic and Yugoslavia
and the minutes of the Councils of Foreign Affairs and Economy)», (1935: 140).
44. PMRA Catalogues of Council of Ministers’ Decrees (1928 and afterwards), 30..18.1.2/46.50.17.
45. Following the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, Inner Manchuria was proclaimed as an
independent state, Manchuria, by the Japanese.
46. PMRA Catalogue of General Directorate of Transactions, 030.10/179.230..8. This document is
an important report of the inter-ministerial commission established to address the opium problem in
1935. 
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47. «Türkiye Cümhuriyet ile Yugoslavya Hükümeti arasında aktedilen afyon İtilafnamesinin tasdikı
hakkında 1/591 numaralı kanun layihası ve Hariciye ve İktisad encümenleri mazbataları (Draft bill No
1/591 on the approval of the opium agreement signed between the Turkish Republic and Yugoslavia
and the minutes of the Councils of Foreign Affairs and Economy)», (1935: 138).
48. I gathered the data from the government statistical yearbooks of the Public Directorate of Sta-
tistics (İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü). 
Health in the opium question. In the Assembly, Emin Sazak, one of the deputies critical
of this policy, argued that the Ministry of Economy should have been fully authorised to
decide about the opium question because the Ministry of Health, with its «almost hu-
manitarian and prophet-like spirit», had caused losses of at least two or three million Turk-
ish liras47.
FIGURE 2
Turkey’s opium exports, 1923 - 1945 
Source: İstatistik Yıllığı 1936-1937 (1937: 240); İstatistik Yıllığı 1942-1945 (1946: 379)48.
By 1935 there was increasing unrest among the Turkish ruling elites regarding governance
of the opium problem, as economic and political necessities challenged medical discourse
and conventional obligations. The economic arguments were voiced by the Monopoly, the
Ministry of Economy, and deputies from opium producing cities. The government itself
was uneasy with the contentious and conflicting politics resulting from the new legisla-
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formed on 17 May 1935, to discuss «the difficult situation of opium’s domestic and for-
eign trade, and significant issues affecting the Monopoly’s existence and continuity»49. The
commission was comprised of representatives from the Ministries of Economy, Finance,
Agriculture, Foreign Affairs, and Health and Social Welfare. In its report, it cited the «car-
tel’s causeless boycott policy and excess opium stocks in the hands of the Monopoly» as
the main reasons for the on-going difficulties in the opium market. To compete with the
cartel, the commission urged the Monopoly to establish an opiate factory in Ankara as
prescribed by the 1933 laws. Stronger restrictions on opium production were also sug-
gested to reduce the opium stockpile. The commission also criticised the Opium Com-
mittee of the League of Nations for what they called «prejudiced policies» against Turkey.
To overcome those biases, the report underscored the urgency of defending Turkey’s rights
before the Opium Committee.
As a final point in its comprehensive evaluation, the inter-ministerial commission called
for a consensus among the ruling elites. Aware of the conflicting political differences pre-
venting a consensus, it addressed the Ministry of Health as the principal body on the
opium question, stating that: 
The agricultural, economic and commercial necessities may conflict with medical
and conventional ones in opium commerce. However, the government’s declared po-
licy is to give preference to medical and conventional necessity in these conflicts be-
cause the Ministry of Health is responsible for implementing medical and conven-
tional provisions50.
The 1935 report of the inter-ministerial commission reinforced the decisive position
of the Ministry of Health regarding the opium problem. The Ministry’s dominant posi-
tion had both ideological and political effects on the evolution of the opium issue up un-
til World War II. Medical discourse on opium flexed its ideological muscle in successive
congresses and conferences on «toxicomania», or drug abuse. The Sixth National Turk-
ish Medical Congress in 1935 was actually dedicated to «toxicomania with poisons other
than alcohol». The Congress defined opium, morphine, cocaine, heroin, hemp, and to-
bacco as poisons and claimed that their use had become a social threat (Şakir, 1935). Med-
ical symptoms, treatment, and the struggle against these substances were addressed and
doctors were assigned the task of strengthening the government’s administrative meas-
ures and warning the public, especially youth and children.
49. PMRA Catalogue of General Directorate of Transactions, 030.10/179.230..8.Appendix I, Alakalı
Vekaletlerle Komisyonda dilekler, p. 9.
50. PMRA Catalogue of General Directorate of Transactions, 030.10/179.230..8.Appendix.
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The Turkish medical elites developed an agenda for turning public opinion against
these «poisons» in the 1935 Congress. They spearheaded the propaganda against opium
addiction through newspaper articles, pamphlets, and books51. Dr. Akil Muhtar Özden,
one of the most prominent Turkish doctors, organized a youth-oriented conference at the
Istanbul Faculty of Medicine, the only medical school in Turkey at that time. He described
the conference, held on 4 March 1937, as an «invitation to all prospective doctors to join
the struggle against the social and human disaster of toxicomania» (Özden, 1937: 1). The
common characteristic of propaganda efforts was the inevitability and necessity of Turk-
ish opium policy, even if this meant certain economic losses.
The Ministry of Health, with its authority and dominance re-validated by the inter-
ministerial commission, asserted its power through scathing criticisms of other actors who
called for more flexible reading of the laws, to favour economic concerns. On 11 May
1936, the Ministry of Health published a review of the previous three years52. Citing con-
ventional obligations, the Ministry severely criticised the Narcotic Drugs Monopoly for
its commercial decisions, its method of determining production restriction, and its opium
standardisation criterion. It accused the Monopoly of making market-oriented decisions
that might «bring short-term and artificial benefits but in the long run might lead to con-
siderable material and moral losses». The report emphasised the need to develop a «ra-
tional technique» for restricting production, which was seen as the «essence of the opium
problem». At the end of the report, the Ministry even questioned whether the Monopoly
was an adequate structure for the opium sector, just three years after it was hailed as the
best solution.
During the era leading up to World War II, the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare
went beyond criticism. It sought to block any policy proposals aimed at even minimally
revising strict compliance with international conventions. The Joint Central Office of
Turkey and Yugoslavia for Opium Sale prepared a memorandum on 26 November 1936
that would facilitate joint action by the two countries in addressing the opium problem53.
The memorandum consisted of nine demands that voiced the rights of the producer coun-
tries. These included requiring that countries that had ratified the Geneva Convention only
imported opium from producer countries that had also ratified the convention; or not al-
lowing new countries to produce opium. The Ministry of Health responded harshly to this
memorandum and questioned the legitimacy of the Joint Sale Office. It did not approve
51. For some examples, see RAGIP (11 October 1933: 6; 17 October 1933: 6). The «Heroinomani»
section of Afyon: Türkiye’de ve Dünyada was written by Dr. Ahmet Şükrü Bey who was the neu-
ropathology expert at Cerrahpaşa Hospital. See Narcotic Drugs Monopoly (s.a.:19-24).
52. PMRA Catalogue of General Directorate of Transactions, 030.10/178.230..10. p. 21-41. 
53. PMRA Catalogue of General Directorate of Transactions, 030.10/178.231..1.
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of voicing ‘suspicious views’ towards foreign bodies. As an explanation, the Ministry of
Economy replied that the memorandum had been prepared at the insistence of Yu-
goslavia’s Prime Minister, Milan Stoyadinovich. The reply attempted to persuade the Min-
istry of Health that the memorandum «aimed to ensure a new benefit for the millions of
opium producers who were really in a very difficult situation»54. Moreover, the Ministry
of Economy proposed that the two countries should jointly defend the memorandum be-
fore the Opium Committee of the League of Nations. Despite urgent economic warnings,
the Ministry of Health did not allow presentation of the memorandum even to the Turk-
ish Cabinet, claiming that its demands were «unenforceable and did not take into account
the laws» and that the «opium problem was not a national, but an international issue»55.
Domestic opposition to a more flexible application of the international conventions
prevented any attempts to favour economic concerns. However, Turkish elites decided to
launch a more active policy in 1938. The policy revision was triggered by two international
developments: the League of Nations’ plans to hold a conference on the restriction of
opium production and the 1938 visit of Mr. Eric Extrand, Director of the Welfare Affairs
and Opium Branch of the League of Nations, to Turkey. To address the first concern, Turk-
ish elites sought to postpone the conference or persuade the League of Nations to hold
a preliminary conference for opium producer countries. If these were unsuccessful, they
would discuss an alternative policy for «gaining concessions» from the production re-
striction. Turkish foreign officials were to defend two points before the League of Nations:
Turkey’s authorisation to produce the maximum percentage of legal production amount,
and compulsory production restriction on all producer countries, including Iran56. Mr.
Extrand’s visit was seen as a trigger for these interests and an opportunity to negotiate
Turkey’s rightful demands as a result of its altruism and commitment to the conventions, and
to present the Turkish point of view supported by irrefutable evidence57.
In the midst of preparations for these international negotiations, legislation was en-
acted in 1938 that shut the Narcotic Drugs Monopoly down and replaced it with the new
Soil Products Office (Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi) on 24 June 193858. The Monopoly had
only survived for five years under financial pressure, excess stock problems, marketing fail-
ures, and the Ministry of Health’s opposition to its market-oriented actions. As Erdinç
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54. PMRA Catalogue of General Directorate of Transactions, 030.10/178.231..1.
55. PMRA Catalogue of General Directorate of Transactions, 030.10/178.231..1.
56. PMRA Catalogue of the General Directorate of Transactions, 030.10/178.230..11.
57. PMRA Catalogue of the General Directorate of Transactions, 030.10/178.231..1.
58. «Toprak mahsulleri ofisi kanunu layihası ve İktisad, Ziraat, Maliye ve Bütçe encümenleri
mazbataları (1/1038) (Draft bill No 1/1038 on the Soil Products Office and the minutes of the Coun-
cils of Economy, Agriculture, Treasury and Budget)», (1938: 310-318).
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mentioned, corruption allegations also influenced the replacement of the Monopoly with
the Soil Products Office (Erdinç, 2004: 141). 
Parliamentary discussion on the law again revealed the on-going and growing tension
among Turkish political elites. In the debate, deputies representing opium producing cities
expressed their criticisms and dissenting opinions. Rasih Kaplan, a deputy from Antalya,
argued that Turkey alone had «undertaken all the trouble of rescuing humanity»; while no
other country had done anything to address opium problem59. The Minister of Economy,
Şakir Kesebir, echoed Kaplan’s argument, declaring that no other consumer or producer
country besides Turkey had adhered to the international conventions. To appease the dis-
senters, Kesebir discussed the policy revisions that the government planned to negotiate
with the Opium Commission of the League of Nations, and expressed hopeful expecta-
tions regarding diplomatic efforts. The dissenting deputies were less optimistic. Rasih Ka-
plan proposed the abolition of the international conventions unilaterally implemented by
Turkey, and was supported by Emin Sazak, deputy from Eskişehir; Berç Türker, deputy
from Afyonkarahisar; and Dr. Osman Şevki Uludağ, deputy from Konya. 
The proposer deputies were the same who had been criticizing the government and
especially the Ministry of Health policies since 1933. This was because the deputies from
opium producing cities were voicing the general dissidence among producers from the
changing policies. The opium producers had complained about the Monopoly’s new and
utterly problematic purchasing system that imposed a short purchasing period, causing
unsold opium to accumulate in the hands of producers. It created a cash deficit for pro-
ducers due to the implementation of an initial payment system based on expert estimates
of morphine content. In addition to the problems generated by the Monopoly’s purchasing
system, producers also suffered from production prohibitions, declining opium prices, and
failure of the new regime to eliminate agricultural intermediaries. Despite limited polit-
ical participation channels in the early Republican Era, producers continued to forward
their complaints and demands to the government through election district reports and
inspection district reports written by deputies, or local party congresses60. Political crit-
59. «Toprak mahsulleri ofisi kanunu layihası ve İktisad, Ziraat, Maliye ve Bütçe encümenleri
mazbataları (1/1038) (Draft bill No 1/1038 on the Soil Products Office and the minutes of the Coun-
cils of Economy, Agriculture, Treasury and Budget)», (1938: 311).
60. For more on the impact of changing opium policies on rural society and the producers’ responses
to those changes, see GÜRSOY (2007: 117-152). Small-scale family holdings were historically domi-
nant in Turkish opium production, despite the existence of large-scale farmers and tenants. In this text,
«producers» generally refer to the family smallholdings of opium growers. However, the political re-
sponses of producers are not easily classified according to land ownership patterns in the early
republican context. Growers were deprived of organized interest group activity and historical pri-
mary or secondary sources are insufficient.
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icism and opposition by the deputies was a reflection of discontent in rural society over
changing opium policies. 
The 1938 proposal to abolish the international conventions was the first well-defined
opposition stand against the 1933 legislation. It was important enough to merit response
from the Prime Minister, Celal Bayar. In a long speech, Bayar acknowledged the unfortu-
nate reality that Turkey was left alone in the implementation of the international conventions;
but he held that their abolition was not the solution. He promoted the government
agenda for more influential representation before the League of Nations, aimed at secur-
ing the necessary policy changes in favour of Turkey. Bayar emphasised that Turkey
should never have been accused of smuggling, and the adoption of the conventions in 1933
had eliminated those accusations. Hence, the government needed to keep negotiations alive,
with its new vision and call for policy revision. Bayar managed to persuade the opposition,
who dropped their proposal to abolish the international conventions. At the end of the de-
bates, the new legislation for the Soil Products Office was accepted by Parliament61.
The process of preparation for negotiations with the League of Nations had modified
Turkish priorities and policies on opium. Slowly, the political balance began to shift in
favour of economic and agricultural priorities over medical and conventional ones. After
discussion of the issue in the inter-ministerial commission formed in 1938, Turkey com-
pleted its programme for international negotiations in 1939. The centrepiece of the pro-
gramme was Turkish opposition to conventional restrictions on opium production. Up-
holding the sovereignty of producer states over their own agricultural production,
international control of exports was proposed rather than eradication of production.
Opium production should be banned in countries that had begun cultivation after 1925,
the year of the first international convention on opium. Also, all producer states should
participate fully in the international conference on opium production restriction62.
Regarding the control of opium exports, the Turkish programme proposed a quota
regime proportional to the export share of each country. The system would favour
Turkey since Turkish exports constituted more than 65 per cent of legal international
opium trade63. Furthermore, importing countries that had ratified the international
61. «Toprak mahsulleri ofisi kanunu layihası ve İktisad, Ziraat, Maliye ve Bütçe encümenleri
mazbataları (1/1038) (Draft bill No 1/1038 on the Soil Products Office and the minutes of the Coun-
cils of Economy, Agriculture, Treasury and Budget)», (1938: 314-315).
62. PMRA Catalogue of the General Directorate of Transactions, 030.10/178.231..3.p. 2.
63. PMRA Catalogues of Council of Ministers’ Decrees (1928 and afterwards), 30..18.1.2/
87.42..10.p. 6. This document mentions the worldwide statistics collected by the Opium Committee
of the League of Nations. 
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conventions should be required to only purchase opium from producer countries that had
ratified the conventions64. Finally, Turkey proposed mandatory destruction of confiscated
opium65. 
The Turkish committee consisted of three representatives who would defend these pro-
posals as the country’s official position and programme in negotiations with the Opium
Commission in the spring of 1939. These representatives were: Necmettin Sadak, per-
manent representative of Turkey on the Opium Commission of the League of Nations;
Servet Berk, the organisational manager of the Ministry of Economy; and Hamza Osman,
the general manager of the former Monopoly and parliamentary deputy from Afy-
onkarahisar. The content of the 1939 programme shows the change in the balance of
power among the Turkish elites, contrary to the programme claim that Turkey had been
defending these views from the beginning66. While the Ministry of Health had not ap-
proved the presentation of similar proposals even to the Turkish cabinet only three years
before, their revised versions became Turkish official point of view in the international ne-
gotiations in 1939. Though the negotiations never took place, Turkey’s new position was
fully operational at the outbreak of World War II. 
The onset of global conflict opened another phase in Turkey’s long-lasting opium
problem. The increasing demand for morphine production, and erosion of the interna-
tional conventions and regulations gave the Turkish ruling elites a window of opportu-
nity for radical policy change. In May 1940, the government returned all confiscated in-
dustrial materials and the equipment used in the manufacture of prepared opium to the
owners of the ETKIM factory67. The opium trade also enjoyed a worldwide relaxation
of restrictions. Germany was Turkey’s main trading partner during the war era; opium
was sold to Germany in return for atebrin and prokinin, with trade quotas increasing un-
til 194368.
64. PMRA Catalogues of Council of Ministers’ Decrees (1928 and afterwards),
30..18.1.2/87.42..10.p.7. and PMRA Catalogue of the General Directorate of Transactions,
030.10/178.231..3. p. 3.
65. PMRA Catalogue of the General Directorate of Transactions, 030.10/178.231..3.p. 3.and PMRA
Catalogues of Council of Ministers’ Decrees (1928 and afterwards), 30..18.1.2/87.42..10. p. 7.
66. PMRA Catalogues of Council of Ministers’ Decrees (1928 and afterwards),
30..18.1.2/87.42..10.p. 4.
67. PMRA Catalogues of Council of Ministers’ Decrees (1928 and afterwards), 30..18.1.2/71.53..14.
68. PMRA Catalogues of Council of Ministers’ Decrees (1928 and afterwards),
30..18.1.2/101.28..1.Atebrin and prokinin were synthetic drugs used for the treatment of malaria.
Opium in return for atebrin was legislated in 1942 following the meeting of the Ministers of For-
eign Affairs of the two countries. Trade for prokinin was legislated in 1943. For this process, see
PMRA Catalogues of Council of Ministers’ Decrees (1928 and afterwards), 30..18.1.2/99.63..4.;
PMRA Catalogues of Council of Ministers’ Decrees (1928 and afterwards), 30..18.1.2/99.73..11.;
HA61__Maquetación HA  28/10/2013  11:06  Página 138
Turkey added new cultivation districts to its 1941 list: Göynük, in Bolu; Ürgüp, in Kay-
seri for opium poppy and seed; and five districts in Manisa for poppy oil production69.
Under war conditions, Turkey began to implement the opium laws in a more flexible man-
ner as medical and conventional priorities faded in a war economy. 
6. CONCLUSION
This account of opium politics in early republican Turkey provides new insights into the
international reconstruction of opium regime by the twentieth century and the differences
among Turkish ruling elites on how to govern. Examination of the Turkish experience con-
tributes to historiography on narcotics in general, and opium in particular. This article
focuses on the period of first restrictive legislation, which has received little attention in
the historical account of Turkish opium, and the contentious politics involved in formu-
lating and applying the laws. Consequently, it enables us to question the prevailing epis-
temological assumptions of absolute dominance and homogeneity among the governing
elites in early republican historiography.
By the turn of the twentieth century, the mentality behind opium policies radically
shifted towards restriction and selective prohibition, resulting in binding international con-
ventions on opium. Turkey was both a traditional and leading opium producing and ex-
porting country, so the young republic was directly affected by the new opium regime.
In 1931-2, the government faced intense political pressure from the League of Nations
and the USA to adopt the international opium conventions. Moreover, economic con-
ditions in the opium market were deteriorating due to the Great Depression and com-
mercial disputes with Turkey’s traditional buyers. Accusations of illegal trafficking and
«narcotizing» other nations, along with the economic hardships in the opium market led
Turkey to enact new laws in 1933. 
Though the new legislation defused the international pressure on the young Repub-
lic, its application led to divisions among Turkish ruling elites. The Ministry of Health
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PMRA Catalogues of Council of Ministers’ Decrees (1928 and afterwards), 30..18.1.2/101.15..2.;
and PMRA Catalogues of Council of Ministers’ Decrees (1928 and afterwards), 30..18.1.2/
101.24..11.
69. PMRA Catalogues of Council of Ministers’ Decrees (1928 and afterwards), 30..18.1.2/112.78..9.
The cultivation allowance specifically given to these districts is essential for demonstrating the impact
of peasant demands that were forwarded to the deputies during the 1930s. For a more detailed dis-
cussion on the relation between the cultivation allowances and producer reactions, see GÜRSOY (2007:
143-145).
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strongly supported and acted as guardian of total adherence to conventional obligations.
The sacrifice of economic well-being for the sake of «humanity» was disputed mainly by
elites represented by the Ministry of Economy, who sought a more flexible reading of the
regulations. Contrary to conventional Turkish historiography, which perceives the Kemalist
state elites as a homogenous and non-conflictive entity, this article argues that the opium
problem created a great deal of dissidence and controversy among Turkish ruling elites,
who struggled over opium policy-making during the interwar era. 
World War II changed the political balance among the Turkish elites and the entire in-
ternational opium regime. As conventional regulatory frameworks collapsed and opium
demand increased due to the conflict, Turkish state elites relaxed their strict compliance
with international restrictions on opium production, trade, and manufacture. This
brought about a spontaneous solution to the opium problem that had divided Turkish gov-
erning elites with divergent policy priorities in the 1930s. 
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